Foundation for the Study of Religion Essay

a). Discuss some of the issues raised in Meta-Ethics. (17 marks)b). How convincing is the view that, when talking of devotion, we are talking roughly facts? (33 marks)(Total 50 marks)Notes Remember, in an test, you have 30 minutes to choose, plan, and write any essay. At AS Level, exam questions are twofold i.e., there will be an (a) section and a (b) section. Do not forget to answer both sections of a question Usually, the marks appear beside each section of a question. In each question, section (a) holds 17 marks, and section (b) holds 33 marks. A total of 50 marks per question. Write your responses to questions appropriately its no safe(p) having a exact (a) section and a brief (b) This model essay is structured so that it is realistic in its time expectations. If you have revised thoroughly, and know your stuff, you should be create verbally this sort of exam essay. Remember, do not waffle. An examiner will not assess 65% waffle and 35% real content in an exam essay Keep y our essay responses thorough, further concise again, you have very little time to respond to questions Finally, it remains for me to wish you very good luck, cheerful last minute revision, and a most successful first exama. Discuss some of the issues raised in Meta-Ethics.Ethics is the study of how deal behave, and how they should behave. It is found on ideas of what is lessonisticly good. But, in order to understand ethics, a definition of good needs to be determined. Here, iness sees that such ideas will interchange from person to person and from culture to culture. Likewise, such ideas explain why there is such a variety of moral systems in utilisation today and a marked difference in the level of commitment to a personal moral edict.Ethics and ethical style, the study of which Meta-Ethics is part, empennage be split into tercet distinct branches descriptive, normative and meta-ethical. On the one hand, descriptive ethics describes the way we live and the moral ch oices we happen to make. On the other, normative ethics employs the kind of wording which is more openly moral and presents a clearer idea about what is held to be right or wrong so, a statement such as It is ever wrong to tell a lie is a normative statement. Contrastingly to both, meta-ethics is the study of the meaning of ethics itself, gauging the meaning of ethical language, and taking into consideration the say-so of moral claims and the effects of personal preference.Bearing this in mind, it is possible to note that meta-ethical theory poses questions such as Can we designate which action is good, high-risk, right, or wrong? and again, Is it possible to give a definition to good, bad, right, or wrong in themselves? Admittedly, all quad of these words are related from a moral point of view. But, if we could measure good completely and accurately, then we would be able to measure everything else against it. Yet, philosophically, it is unimaginable to define good so complet ely. For instance, if one were asked to define yellow, one is able to say what yellow is like (such as Yellow is like a bananas jacket) but, one unable to say completely and accurately what yellowness is. Thus, in the same way, one is able to say what good is like, yet one is unable to say what good is. Naturally, it could be argued that good actions add to the well- beingness of all concerned but, again, good actions depend very much on individual preference and ones individual idea of good.The puzzle, then, of how to define good has intrigued philosophers for thousands of twelvemonths. Indeed, the ancient Greek philosopher, Aristotle, defined good as being how far something fulfilled its purpose in life for example, a good building is one which looks pleasing aesthetically, provides comfort and shelters from the elements. Similarly, a good person is one who fulfils well the role into which he or she has been placed. To illustrate this point further, a good slave works well as a s lave and, again, a good ruler rules the community effectively, maximising everyones happiness. This nestle has its origins in the Greek word telos meaning purpose and is therefore referred to as the teleological approach to ethics, a purpose-based criterion for gauging what is good.A differing method is the deontological approach to ethics, which has its origins in the Greek word deon meaning duty. Unlike the teleological approach, this one is a duty-based criterion for gauging what is good something is good if it fulfils it duty. For instance, Immanuel Kant, bearing in mind the absolute rule of morality Do not take away, claimed that one should never steal under any circumstances because it is always wrong in itself. For example, if you came across something that had been abandoned by someone who could not possibly have any use for it, even if you needed it and it would hurt no one to take it, it is still stealing and, therefore, wrong in itself. Thus, to do good, one always ess ential do ones duty.Meta-ethics, then, attempts to go a long way in explaining the essence of good and good action, combining alike viewpoints yet, likewise, displaying very contrastive perspectives of the real meaning of good.b. How convincing is the view that, when talking of morality, we are talking about facts?But, when attempting to define good, and certainly when considering ethics as a whole, is it genuinely possible to say that moral systems deal with facts? Some ethicists would claim not. GE Moore, for example, in his book Principia Ethica (1902) claimed that good is impossible to define because it entirely depends on the moral codes a person brings to a occurrence situation. This would suggest that, owing to the wide range and variety of personal preference in ethical systems, it is impossible to talk of facts when dealing with morality. Moore, though, did suggest that good was an entity in itself and that it was something which human beings intuitively sought. Indeed, human beings do a thing that is good in order to master some long-term goal. However, he stated that in doing so, people commit what he coined the Naturalistic Fallacy. Namely, that in finding oneself in a particular moral dilemma people assume it is natural and logical to shift immediately from dilemma to solution, treating moral conclusions as if they were absolute.For instance, imagine a 15 year old girl having her drink spiked by a much older man who then makes her pregnant. Indeed, the girl did not want a familiar relationship with the man and was horrified when she realised what had happened, particularly because she was a devout Christian with high moral standards. Many people would say that the girl ought to be offered medical treatment such as the morning-after pill or an abortion.Here, using the principle known in moral philosophy as Humes constabulary, Moore would claim that people have committed the Naturalistic Fallacy because they have moved from an is statement to an ought statement. In other words, they move from a description of how things actually are, to how they ought to be. Put in a simpler form, (A) A teenage girl is pregnant against her wishes (B) She ought to be offered an abortion. A is the is statement, B is the ought statement yet, to move from one to the other, Moore claimed that an intermediate (or, midway) mesmerism is needed. This could be as follows A woman should only carry a child to copious term when she has chosen to be pregnant. This is known as a value proposition and it is this element of the equation that gives the conclusion (B) its moral force.But exactly why does Moore refer to this straight shift from an is to an ought a misleading belief? It is because (B) is simply a blind, nave opinion without any value whatsoever. The intermediate proposition gives it moral value and force because it establishes that the pregnant girl is neither a woman nor one who has chosen to be pregnant. Thus, it states that she is a te enage girl who is pregnant against her wishes and, because of the intermediate proposition of women only carrying a child to full term when she has chosen to be pregnant, the girls situation goes against the moral code. Naturally, using a different moral value in the intermediate grade would produce a different outcome, which suggests that, when talking of morality and moral codes, we are not always talking about facts.Like Moore, whose claims reject the idea of morality being factually-based, RM Hare developed a theory for ethical language called Prescriptivism, in which he claimed that in prescribing a particular course of action for others, people ought to ask Am I prepared to prescribe that somebody else should do it to me if the roles were reversed?. (Interestingly, this idea is parallel with the golden rule of Christianity that appears in Matthew 712 Do unto others as you would have done unto you.)Although this gives the impression that all people should be treated equally, it does not suggest that morality is factually-based because such moral rules send away be accepted or rejected. Moral statements, then, according to Hare, are more than mere signs of the personal preference of the speaker for him, they prescribe a course of action. But, scantily as he claimed moral rules are hugely important in influencing lives, he also added that one cannot say moral rules are true or false. Thus, it is untrue that when talking of morality we are talking about facts.In morality, then, there is a difference in how language is used. In everyday communication, language can be used in either cognitive or non-cognitive ways. Used cognitively, language states fact and reasoning and is non-moral in other words, it has no moral values attached. However, used non-cognitively in a moral setting, language aims to expect attitudes, exercising an influence over people. In morality, this influence is to persuade people of the moral rightness or wrongness of an action.Inde ed, CL Stevenson, a philosopher closely associated with Emotivism a system of morality based on feeling claimed that, when used non-cognitively, the word good is very persuasive because it has a moral tag which tries to draw the listener into taking a moral stance. It pulls on the emotions. Certainly, Stevenson suggested ones moral code is an emotional response one simply feels something is good or bad. Again, then, it is impossible to say that when we talk of morality, we talk of facts because, as Emotivism shows, individual feelings differ and, therefore, individual moral codes influenced by feelings similarly are going to differ.Thus, in conclusion, it is unconvincing to say that, when we are talking of morality, we are talking about facts Moore, would agree because his value propositions in moral dilemmas can easily be altered to produce a different outcome and, therefore, a different moral force Hare claimed one cannot say moral rules are true or false, therefore failing to deliver morality to the territory of fact and, finally, Stevenson claims that individual moral codes are influenced by individual feelings about the rightness or wrongness of an action, thus rendering factually-based morality a nonsense owing to the rich diversity of individual emotion.Indeed, the passing influential philosopher, AJ Ayer would agree with such an avowal because he suggested all moral statements are meaningless statements. For example, how could one prove that it is wrong to cheat? He insisted that such statements as Is it wrong to cheat are totally without meaning or provable sense because, logically and empirically, they cannot be shown to be true. All one can do is show that lots of people believe it is wrong to cheat. All they can do is express a personal dislike of cheats, cheating, and its consequences they can express how they consider it to be unfair. That is, they can express how it does not coincide with what they believe to be fair and right but that is a ll. Moral statements, then, are reduced in this way to personal preferences and are not concerned with fact.